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KATZ AND DOGS: CANINE SNIFF INSPECTIONS
AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The canine nose, used by school officials and law enforcement officers
to detect the presence of contraband on persons or in closed containers
such as suitcases, lockers, and cars is becoming an increasingly frequent
intruder in the lives of Americans.' Judicial analysis of whether this prac-
tice constitutes a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment'
has important implications for search and seizure law, particularly if the
reasoning of these cases is extended to other information-gathering tech-
niques which technology has given and will soon give to law enforcement
agencies. Moreover, a recent United States Supreme Court decision on
the subject' further highlights its importance. This note examines the ques-
tion of whether canine sniff inspections are searches under the fourth
amendment through critical examination of the federal appellate and
Supreme Court jurisprudence on the subject and then by argument that
canine sniff inspections should be within the ambit of the fourth
amendment.
Extant Sniff Law
Virtually all of the dog-sniff cases fall neatly into two categories. The
first category, represented by a significant majority of the reported cases,
consists of canine inspections of luggage, purses, or packages of travellers
(usually air travellers) triggered by a match between the behavior of the
suspect and some sort of "drug courier profile."" The dog's indication
Copyright 1984, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw.
I. The writer's search has revealed nearly two hundred such cases in courts of record.
Obviously, this number greatly understates the frequency of dog-sniff investigations.
2. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
3. United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983).
4. A drug courier profile is "an informally compiled abstract of characteristics thought
typical of persons carrying illicit drugs." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 547
n.l (1980).
Drug couriers more often than not can be expected to display several of the follow-
ing "primary" characteristics:
(I) arrival from or departure to an identified source city;
(2) carrying little or no luggage or large quantities of empty suitcases;
(3) unusual itinerary, such as rapid turnaround time for a very lengthy airplane
trip;
(4) use of an alias;
(5) carrying unusually large amounts of currency in the many thousands of
dollars usually on their person, in briefcases or bags;
(6) purchasing airline tickets with a large amount of small denomination cur-
rency; and
(7) unusual nervousness beyond that ordinarily exhibited by passengers.
... In addition, drug runners often will display several of the following "secon-
dary" characteristics:
(1) The almost exclusive use of public transportation, particularly taxicabs,
in departing from the airport;
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that the package contains contraband, called an "alert," usually serves
as probable cause for a search or arrest warrant. The second category
includes three distinguishable uses of canines in the schools: indiscriminate
inspections ("dragnet sniffs") of unattended lockers and cars; dragnet
sniffs of persons, purses, and other items closely associated with the per-
son; and inspections of particular students or items based on an in-
dividualized suspicion directed toward that student or item. For purposes
of convenience, these two broad categories will be referred to as "airport
sniffs" and "school sniffs."
Airport Sniffs
The federal circuits are divided on the question of whether airport
sniffs constitute fourth amendment intrusions. However, there is a distinct
majority view, explicitly adopted by the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh,
and Tenth Circuits, that an airport sniff is simply not a search.
The Second Circuit held in United States v. Waltzer5 that an alert
by a trained drug-detecting dog with an excellent record for accuracy con-
stituted probable cause for a warrantless arrest of the defendant. The opin-
ion expressly states that a canine sniff is neither a search nor a seizure
for fourth amendment purposes.' The defendant's conformity with a drug
courier profile at the departure terminal in Ft. Lauderdale prompted the
investigations which led to the sniff of the defendant's luggage upon his
arrival at Kennedy International Airport.'
Under very similar facts, the Fourth Circuit held in United States v.
Sullivan8 that a sniff of luggage entrusted to an airline does not invade
any reasonable expectation of privacy and is not a search,9 and this view
still appears to be the law of the Fourth Circuit."
In United States v. Goldstein," the Fifth Circuit, confronted with1
(2) Immediately making a telephone call after deplaning;
(3) Leaving a fictitious telephone number with the airline; and
(4) Excessive travel to source or distribution cities.
United States v. Waksal, 709 F.2d 653, 655 n.2 (lth Cir. 1983).
5. 682 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3543 (1983).
6. Id. at 373.
7.. Id. at 371.
8. 625 F.2d 9 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 923 (1981) (held that partial
alert to defendant's suitcases by one trained narcotics-detecting dog and a full alert by another
when combined with behavior of defendant in a manner typical of drug couriers is suffi-
cient probable cause to support a warrant to search the luggage).
9. Id. at 13.
10. See United States v. Robinson, 707 F.2d 811 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that an alert
by a trained narcotics-detecting canine to a "suspicious looking" package is sufficient prob-
able cause for a warrantless search of the package).
11. 635 F.2d 356 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981) (defendant's conformity
with drug courier profile at Orlando International Airport induced Drug Enforcement Ad-
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facts much like those in Waltzer, stated clearly that a canine sniff is not
a search.'" Four months later, the court extended Goldstein to allow agents
to "prep" a bag by squeezing it to force air from its interior thereby
giving the dog a better sample of air to sniff.'3
United States v. Lewis,' a case much like the other airport cases,
indicates that the Sixth Circuit adheres to the majority view, as does United
States v. Klein'5 for the Seventh Circuit. However, the Klein court expressly
avoided deciding whether an "indiscriminate, dragnet-type sniffing opera-
tion" is a search.' Nevertheless, as the scope of an activity is relevant
only as to its reasonableness once it has been characterized as a search, 7
this statement is inconsistant with the opinion's blanket exclusion of dog
sniffs from fourth amendment scrutiny.
Faced with a typical airport sniff fact pattern, the Tenth Circuit in
United States v. McCranie8 states flatly that "[tihe use of a sniffing dog
is not a search or a seizure."' 9 This statement is a retreat from that cir-
cuit's position in United States v. MacDonald," which held that a dog
sniff is not an unreasonable search when police reasonably suspect criminal
activity. " The clear implication of MacDonald is that a sniff does invoke
the fourth amendment. Despite its retreat from MacDonald, the McCranie
ministration agents to subject his luggage to a sniff inspection; the defendant was arrested
when he refused to consent to a full search of his luggage after the dog alerted).
12. Id. at 360-61.
13. United States v. Viera, 644 F.2d 509, 511 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 867
(1981) (bus driver's observation that bus passenger's luggage appeared to contain drugs prompted
Drug Enforcement Administration agents to subject luggage to sniff inspection; held that
dog's alert plus driver's observation is sufficient probable cause to obtain warrant to search
the luggage).
14. 708 F.2d 1078 (6th Cir. 1983) (defendant's suspicious behavior prompted two sniffs
of his luggage, one at Miami Airport which produced a mild alert and one in Detroit which
produced a strong alert; the alerts provided sufficient probable cause for a warrant to search
defendant's luggage; the court expressly held that the sniffs did not constitute searches).
15. 626 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1980) (defendants' suspicious behavior led agents to detain
and question them; when agents determined that one defendant was traveling under an as-
sumed name and that both had lied to the agents, they subjected the luggage to a sniff inspec-
tion; the dog's positive reaction supplied probable cause for a warrant to search the luggage).
16. Id. at 27.
17. Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 476 (5th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3536 (1983).
18. 703 F.2d 1213 (10th Cir. 1983) (defendant's suspicious behavior at departure air-
port induced a sniff of his luggage at arrival airport; dog's positive reaction was sufficient
probable cause for a warrant to search the luggage).
19. Id. at 1218.
20. 670 F.2d 910 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 373 (1983) (defendant's
nervous behavior on board airliner aroused suspicions of his seatmate who happened to
be a Drug Enforcement Administration agent; on arrival and after other suspicious behavior
was noted, defendant was questioned and patted down and his luggage subjected to a sniff
inspection; dog's alert led to procurement of a search warrant and a search of the bag).
21. Id. at 914.
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court still declares that "authorities must have some suspicion luggage
contains contraband before it can be sniffed." 22 However, if a sniff is
not a search, it should be subject to no restrictions as to reasonableness,
and there is no valid constitutional basis for subjecting it to a suspicion
requirement. 3 Apparently, the courts are finding that the sniffs are not
searches because those sniffs have tended to be fairly reasonable. However,
the courts' blanket pronouncements may serve to trap appellate courts
and lower courts which are bound by their decisions into intolerable results
when confronted with sniffs conducted under more objectionable
circumstances.
Two circuits have considered cases which invited discussion of whether
a dog sniff is a search but, nevertheless, have failed to make an un-
ambiguous pronouncement on the subject. In 1976, the First Circuit held
in United States v. Race" that an alert by a trained drug-detecting dog
constituted probable cause to arrest defendant." This holding seems to
imply that a sniff is not a search requiring probable cause or some other
constitutional justification. Nevertheless, the opinion never explicitly states
that a canine sniff inspection does not invoke the fourth amendment.
In a sniff of bus terminal lockers based on circumstances which would
probably constitute reasonable suspicion, the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit, in United States v. Fulero,2 6 held the conduct of the police in conduct-
ing the sniff to be "reasonable" and dismissed any constitutional questions
about the inspection with the laconic declaration that "[wie think the argu-
ment is frivolous."
27
Alone among the circuits,28 the Ninth Circuit has adopted the minority
view that a dog sniff is a search. In United States v. Beale,2 9 a dog was
22. 703 F.2d at 1218. For this proposition the court cites United States v. Waltzer,
682 F.2d 370, 372-73 (2d Cir. 1982). The writer finds no support in Waltzer for requiring
a suspicion of any kind before luggage can be sniffed; in fact, the opinion's broad state-
ment on the cited pages that a canine sniff is not a search or a seizure under the fourth
amendment is inconsistent with such a requirement. For further discussion of Waltzer, see
supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
23. Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 476 (5th Cir. 1982).
24. 529 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1976) (dragnet sniff of airline warehouse resulted in alert
to two crates; agent inserted a knife into one of the crates and detected the smell of mari-
juana on the blade; defendant consented to a search of the crates when confronted with
the sniff results after he had loaded the crates into his automobile).
25. Id. at 14.
26. 498 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (two footlockers which smelled strongly of mothballs
and which were being shipped by bus from Yuma, Arizona, a known drug distribution
center, were subjected to a dog sniff; the dog's alert provided probable cause to obtain
a search warrant for the trunks).
27. Id. at 749.
28. Neither the Third Circuit nor the Eighth Circuit appears to have considered the issue.
29. 674 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, vacated and remanded, 103 S. Ct.
3529 (1983) (consider further in light of United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983)).
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used to sniff the luggage of an airline passenger whose behavior com-
ported with a drug courier profile, and the animal's alert was used to
obtain a search warrant for the bag. The court, in unequivocal language
supported by cogent reasoning, held that a dog-sniff inspection is a fourth
amendment intrusion, "albeit a limited one . . .which may be based
on an officer's 'founded' or 'articulable' suspicion rather than probable
cause. '"30 The court considered the facts of the prior cases from the other
circuits rather than merely what they purport to hold, and found that
virtually all of the sniffs in these cases had been supported by some sort
of suspicion, usually a drug courier profile.3 ' The court apparently felt
that its holding was in accord with what the other circuits had done, if
not with what they had said.
School Sniffs
Although school sniffs have not generated as many reported cases
as have airport sniffs, the general problem of the application of the fourth
amendment to the schools and the more specific problem of the constitu-
tionality of canine sniffs in schools have produced a prodigious amount
of law review commentary.32 The complex issue of the applicability of
the Bill of Rights to school children is outside the scope of this analysis.
Instead, the fourth amendment will be assumed applicable in its full rigor
to the schools.
As stated earlier, school sniffs can be divided into three distinct fact
patterns: dragnet sniffs of cars and lockers; dragnet sniffs of persons,
purses, and other items closely associated with the person; and sniffs of
particular persons or items based on some sort of particularized suspicion
directed at that person or item. No cases which consider the last category
have been found.
30. Id. at 1335.
31. Id. at 1335 nn.15-16. It should be emphasized that this observation applies only
to reported cases. Because of wide prosecutorial discretion as to which cases to bring to
trial and the understandable tendency of prosecutors to pursue only their strongest cases,
these cases do not necessarily reflect law enforcement practice in this respect.
32. Gardner, Sniffing for Drugs in the Classroom-Perspectives on Fourth Amend-
ment Scope, 74 NW. U.L. REV. 803 (1980); Trosch, Williams & Devore, Public School
Searches and the Fourth Amendment, II J. L. & Educ. 41 (1982); Comment, Searches
by Drug Detection Dogs in Pennsylvania Public Schools. A Constitutional Analysis, 85 DICK.
L. REv. 143 (1980); Comment, Search and Seizure in the Public Schools: Are Our Children's
Rights Going to the Dogs?, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 119 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Comment,
Search and Seizure]; Note, Fourth Amendment-Searches- Use of Canine to Detect Drug
Paraphernalia on School Children Is an Unreasonable Search Under the Fourth Amend-
ment. Jones v. Latexo Independent School District, 499 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Tex. 1980),
9 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127 (1981); Note, Public School Searches and Seizures, 45 FORDHAM
L. REV. 202 (1976); Note, The Constitutionality of Canine Searches in the Classroom, 71
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 39 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Canine Searches]; Note,
Dog Searches in Schoolrooms-State or Private Action?, 15 VAL. U.L. REv. 137 (1980).
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Two federal circuits have considered the issue of dragnet sniffs of
cars and lockers. Not surprisingly, they have arrived at different results.
In fact, the Fifth Circuit decided the issue and then quickly reversed itself
in the same case, Horton v. Goose Creek Independent School District.
Horton I" attempts to analyze the dog sniff problem logically rather than
by mere citation of cases. Judge Wisdom, writing for the court, declared
that "the intrusion on the cars and lockers . . . must be recognized as
a search governed by the fourth amendment." 3 ' However, this rule did
not long remain the law of the Fifth Circuit. On petition for rehearing,
Horton IPI was issued five months later. In Horton II, the same panel
found Goldstein36 to be controlling on the issue of whether the dragnet
sniffs of student lockers and cars were searches and thus held that these
canine inspections did not invoke the fourth amendment. 7
The Tenth Circuit gave the problem a cursory examination in Zamora
v. Pomeroy,"' in which it held that the joint control exercised by the school
and a student over a locker, and the duty of school officials to police
the school, justified a sniff search of the locker once the probability existed
that it contained contraband. 9 Without saying so explicitly, the case clearly
stands for the proposition that a dog sniff of lockers is a search, but
a limited one which requires only reasonable cause or reasonable
suspicion."'
Sniffs of students' persons have likewise provoked division among
the circuits. In the Fifth Circuit, the otherwise dissonant Horton opinions
are in harmony on the issue, holding sniffs of persons to be searches
permissible only when there is an individualized suspicion." Horton H,
however, explicitly declines to decide whether a sniff of a person from
some distance away constitutes a search. 2 The Tenth Circuit in Zamora
33. 677 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1982). Plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides:
Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
34. 677 F.2d at 480.
35. 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3536 (1983).
36. 635 F.2d 356 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981); see supra note 11 and
accompanying text.
37. 690 F.2d at 477.
38. 639 F.2d 662 (10th Cir. 1981) (dragnet sniff of high school lockers; dog alerted
to Zamora's locker which was subjected to a warrantless search; plaintiff sued under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, quoted supra note 33).
39. Id. at 670-71.
40. Id. at 670.
41. Horton 1, 677 F.2d at 485; Horton II, 690 F.2d at 479.
42. 690 F.2d at 479.
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similarly requires that sniffs of persons be supported by a reasonable cause
or reasonable suspicion. '
In the controversial case of Doe v. Renfrow,4" the Seventh Circuit
held that a dragnet sniff of all students in a school did not violate a
student's fourth amendment rights such that a student had a cause of
action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983' and 1985.6 This result has been
vehemently denounced in strong dissents at every stage of the case's
appellate consideration 7 and in sharply critical law review commentary.
4 8
The facts of this case are particularly capable of producing outrage. A
dog "alerted" to a thirteen-year-old girl in a dragnet sniff of junior high
school students in their classrooms. When the dog continued to alert after
the girl had emptied her pockets, she was subjected to a brief nude search
in the school's nurse's station. Neither inspection of the contents of the
child's pockets nor the nude search revealed the presence of contraband.
The dog's reaction was probably caused by the scent of the child's own
dog, which was in heat and with which she had played that morning before
she came to school.' 9 Although the sniff did not give rise to a cause of
action, the nude search did, and Miss Doe was granted relief.,'
Recent Developments
The United States Supreme Court addressed the dog-sniff problem
this past summer in United States v. Place."' Place is a typical airport
sniff case, including the officers' reliance on a drug courier profile, except
43. 639 F.2d at 670.
44. 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1981).
45. Supra note 33.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) provides in pertinent part:
[I]f two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire . . . for the purpose
of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the
equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the
laws; . . . in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more
persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the
object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in person or property, or
deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United
States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of
damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of
the conspirators.
47. 631 F.2d at 93 (Swygert, J., dissenting); 635 F.2d at 582 (Swygert, J., dissenting
from denial of petition for rehearing); Chief Judge Fairchild and Circuit Judges Wood and
Cuhady also dissented in both instances; 451 U.S. at 1022 (Brennan, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
48. Comment, Search and Seizure, supra note 32, at 131-34; Note, Canine Searches,
supra note 32, at 42-45.
49. Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012, 1017 (N.D. Ind. 1979).
50. 631 F.2d at 92-93.
51. 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983).
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for the fact that Place's luggage was held against his will for ninety minutes
before it was subjected to the highly-trained nose of "Honey."" The Court
held that the ninety-minute detention which preceded the sniff was an
unreasonable seizure under the fourth amendment." This holding clearly
would have sufficed to reverse Place's conviction. Nevertheless, Justice
O'Connor, writing for a seven member majority, addressed herself to the
issues raised by the sniff of the luggage. Justice O'Connor writes that
"exposure of respondent's luggage, which was located in a public place,
to a trained canine-did not constitute a 'search' within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment.""' But for other rather expansive language in
the several sentences which precede the quoted passages, this rather limited
language might be construed as illustrating the Court's intent to limit its
reasoning to the limited factual context before it. However, the Court
discusses the particularly unobtrusive nature of dog sniffs and cohcludes
that the technique is sui generis" and that it is "aware of no other in-
vestigative procedure that is so limited both in the manner in which the
information is obtained and in the content of the information revealed
by the procedure."" This section of the opinion is clearly dictum and
is, therefore, of questionable authority. Its authority is further minimized
by the significant fact that the issue of whether a canine sniff is a search
was neither briefed nor argued by the parties."
These brief paragraphs of dictum also fail to resolve several of the
problems surrounding canine sniffs, particularly the issue of whether even
the broadest and most indiscriminate of sniffs would invoke the fourth
amendment, e.g., a sniff of all passengers leaving an airplane or of all
persons entering an auditorium for a rock concert. Nevertheless, the Court
apparently intends lower courts to be guided by these pronouncements. 8
Such intention notwithstanding, when the Ninth Circuit reconsidered
its Beale opinion on remand from the Supreme Court, it did not retreat
from the beleaguered minority view that a canine sniff invokes the fourth
amendment. The opinion ingeniously evades the intent of the Place dic-
tum by interpreting it to mean that "no additional suspicion is required
to justify exposing luggage to a trained canine once a founded or
articulable suspicion has been established." 9 The court then restated some
of the reasoning underlying its earlier holding, resolutely adhering to its
52. Id. at 2640.
53. Id. at 2645-46.
54. Id. at 2645.
55. Id. at 2644.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 2653 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
58. United States v. Beale, 103 S. Ct. 3529 (1983) (remanded for further consideration
in light of Place).
59. United States v. Beale, No. 80-1652, slip op. at 5124 (9th Cir. Oct. 24, 1983)
(emphasis added).
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reasoning, and remanded the case to the district court for a determina-
tion of whether the sniff was supported by some articulable suspicion.6"
Katz and Dogs
Katz v. United States6 ' revolutionized fourth amendment analysis
when, scarcely three pages into the opinion, it declared that "[i]n the
first place, the correct solution of Fourth Amendment problems is not
necessarily promoted by incantation of the phrase 'constitutionally pro-
tected area.' "I' And, of course, Katz's declaration that "the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places" 63 is familiar to every criminal
procedure student. In Katz, the Court was confronted with a warrantless
recording of petitioner's end of telephone conversations by microphones
placed on top of but not penetrating the telephone booths used by Katz
in his bookmaking enterprise." The Supreme Court repudiated its former
analysis, embodied in Olmstead v. United States," which had held that,
absent a physical penetration of a constitutionally protected area, no search
takes place.
66
The crux of Katz and its seminal contribution to modern fourth
amendment analysis is its abandonment of Olmstead's emphasis on
physical intrusion and trespass in favor of the test embodied in the con-
curring opinion of Justice Harlan that for an intrusion to be a search
''a person [must] have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy and . . . the expectation of privacy [must] be one that society
is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "67 This test is often condensed
into the rubric "reasonable expectation of privacy.""6
In order to determine the theoretical soundness of those cases which
hold that a sniff is not a search, their reasoning must be examined in
light of general fourth amendment doctrine. In any such analysis, one
should bear in mind that:
The decision to characterize an action as a search is in essence
a conclusion about whether the fourth amendment applies at all.
If an activity is not a search or seizure (assuming the activity does
not violate some other constitutional or statutory provision), then
the government enjoys a virtual carte blanche to do as it pleases.6 9
One can abstract from the decisions two basic rationales for holding a
60. Id. at 5125-26.
61. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
62. Id. at 350.
63. Id. at 351.
64. Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130 (9th Cir. 1966).
65. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
66. Id. at 457, 464, 466.
67. 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
68. United States v. Goldstein, 635 F.2d 356, 361 (5th Cir. 1981).
69. Horton II, 690 F.2d at 476.
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canine sniff not to be a search. The first of these is the argument employed
in Place that a sniff is sui generis and a uniquely unobtrusive type of
investigation. A canine inspection, it is argued, does not require opening
of the luggage, does not expose noncontraband items, discloses only the
presence or absence of a contraband item, and causes little inconvenience
or embarrassment."0 In other words, the intrusion resulting from a dog
sniff is so slight that it should not be considered a search.
The second rationale is that a sniff of something (usually luggage)
is not an inspection of that object at all. Instead, it is argued that the
dog is sniffing the air around the object and that since the area is accessi-
ble to the public one does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the airspace surrounding the object." Therefore, because a police officer
who has a right to be where he is and who smells contraband has not
conducted a search, 2 a dog sniff is not a search. The dog's nose is allow-
ed in the place of the officer's nose either because a sniff by a dog is
no different from a sniff by an officer,73 or because the dog's sense of
smell is just like a flashlight in that it merely enhances the sensory
capabilities of the officer."
It is respectfully submitted that the reasoning of these cases is seriously
flawed and should be abandoned. The weaknesses of Place as authority
have already been noted. It should be recalled that neither party briefed
nor argued the dog-sniff issue. As the concurring opinion observed, the
Court "should not decide an issue on which neither party has expressed
any opinion at all. The Court [was] certainly in no position to consider
all the ramifications of this important issue.""
The main vulnerability of the "sniff is not a search" cases is that
they constitute an abandonment of Katz. The first rationale, that a canine
sniff is not a search because of its uniquely unobtrusive nature, clearly
contradicts the principles of Katz. It should now be apparent that if an
activity violates a person's reasonable expectation of privacy, it is a search,
regardless of how unobtrusive the method. Obtrusiveness is a factor more
properly considered in weighing the reasonableness of a search rather than
in answering the threshold question of whether a search has taken place.
70. 103 S. Ct. at 2645; see also United States v. Waltzer, 682 F.2d 370, 373 (2d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3543 (1983); United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459, 462-63
(2d Cir. 1975).
71. United States v. Lewis, 708 F.2d 1078, 1080 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Gold-
stein, 635 F.2d 356, 361 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981); United States v.
Venema, 563 F.2d 1003, 1006 (10th Cir. 1977).
72. United States v. Johnston, 497 F.2d 387, 398 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Martinez-Miramontes, 494 F.2d 808, 810 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974); United
States v. Halliday, 487 F.2d 1215, 1217 (5th Cir. 1973).
73. United States v. Goldstein, 635 F.2d 356, 361 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S.
962 (1981); United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459, 462 (2d Cir. 1975).
74. United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459, 462 n.3, 463 (2d Cir. 1975).
75. 103 S. Ct. at 2653 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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The second rationale, that the sniff is of the airspace around the ob-
ject and that one has no reasonable expectation of privacy in that airspace,
misconstrues the reasonable expectation of privacy test and represents a
retreat to the repudiated "protected areas" analysis of Olmstead, with
its artificial concern for the place searched rather than the nature of the
privacy interest invaded. The misanalysis in this second class of cases begins
with faulty application of the public-view doctrine. It is well-settled law
that what one exposes to public view 6 (or even to public smell)' 7 is not
protected by the fourth amendment. However, that is only true because
the effect of exposing marijuana to public view through the windows of
a vehicle, 8 or of allowing the strong smell of the drug to escape into
the open air,"' is to deprive anyone who bothers to think about the con-
sequences of those actions of the expectation that these activities will re-
main private. The operative factor is the nature of the exposure, not the
nature of the place from which the exposure can be detected.
The public-view doctrine should not be extended to mean that the
mere escape of molecules from a suitcase deprives one of the fourth
amendment's protection simply because the molecules are now in a public
place and may be detected by an animal or a device more sensitive than
the human nose. In the true public-view cases, the presence of a contra-
band substance has clearly been "knowingly revealed to the public." 80
However, in the case of an aroma too faint for detection by the human
nose, nothing has been knowingly revealed to the public unless the public
at large were suddenly to be equipped with highly-trained German
shepherds; hence, the reasonable expectation of privacy is not defeated
in any practical sense. Similarly, the escape of sound waves that only
a microphone could detect from the "protected" interior of Mr. Katz's
phone booth to the "unprotected" exterior did not serve to deprive him
of the reasonable expectation that his conversation would remain private."
Moreover, the extension of the plain-view doctrine to dog sniffs clearly
violates the requirement imposed by the Supreme Court in Coolidge v.
New Hampshire that the officer encounter the object inadvertently in order
for the doctrine to apply.82 In the dog-sniff cases, the trained canines
76. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (1967).
77. United States v. Goldstein, 635 F.2d 356, 361 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S.
962 (1981); United States v. Sullivan, 625 F.2d 9, 13 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 923 (1981).
78. E.g., United States v. Dorr, 636 F.2d 117, 119, 121 (5th Cir. 1981) (narcotics agent
spotted bales of marijuana through the window of a light plane while it was on the ground
for refueling; agent's looking through the window held not to be a search).
79. E.g., United States v. Johns, 707 F.2d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir. 1983) (officers detected
the strong smell of marijuana emanating from trucks; the smell constituted probable cause
for a search warrant, but did not justify an exigent search of the trucks).
80. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
81. Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Use of Canines to Detect Crime, 44 FoRDHAM
L. REV. 973, 986 (1976).
82. 403 U.S. 443, 469-71 (1970).
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are almost always summoned to the scene to sniff particular objects for
the presence of contraband when officers suspect that contraband will
be found.
Furthermore, a dog's nose and an officer's nose are not in-
distinguishable, as some of these cases assert. If there were no difference
between them, no rational law enforcement agency would invest the
substantial resources necessary to acquire, train, and maintain the
animals. 3 In fact, a dog's sense of smell is roughly eight times more sen-
sitive than that of humans,"' and these animals are not certified as trained
drug-detecting dogs unless they are able to score a hundred percent in
a battery of small tests.' These very differences between the human and
canine nose should indicate that one's expectation of privacy in the odor
is reasonable since only a dog can detect it.
Moreover, a dog is not like a flashlight in that it does not enhance
the officer's senses; it replaces them.' 6 Even if the dog did only enhance
the officer's sense of smell, this enhancement may still infringe upon a
protected privacy interest. If the enhancement allows detection of aromas
not otherwise detectable by the human nose alone, it should invoke the
fourth amendment if one applies by analogy the law applying to devices
used to amplify sound.' Therefore, if the smell is perceivable only by
a dog or by another instrumentality more sensitive than human senses,
its escape into a public place should not serve to deprive the owner of
the object being smelled of a reasonable expectation of privacy in its
contents." Indeed, one may take steps to prevent detection of odor by
the intruding canine nose, thus exhibiting directly an intent to render the
aroma private."
The second rationale, that a sniff of something is not an inspection
of the object, also carries with it dangerous implications for search and
seizure law. In these cases, the escape of a tenuous stream of cannabis
molecules from a piece of luggage or a locker (a constitutionally pro-
tected area) into the surrounding public airspace (a non-protected area)
subjects them to detection by a highly-sensitive canine nose without any
protection from the fourth amendment. This reasoning would seem to
imply that detection by means considerably more sensitive than unaided
human perception of whatever characteristics of whatever activity in which
83. Horton I, 677 F.2d at 478.
84. United States v. Beale, 674 F.2d 1327, 1333 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, vacated
and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 3529 (1983).
85. Comment, United States v. Solis: Have the Government's Supersniffers Come Down
with a Case of Constitutional Nasal Congestion?, 13 SAN Disoo L. REV. 410, 418 (1976).
86. United States v. Beale, 674 F.2d 1327, 1334 (9th Cir. 1982).
87. Horton 1, 677 F.2d at 478.
88. Id. at 478-79.
89. United States v. Beale, 674 F.2d 1327, 1334 (9th Cir. 1982).
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one engages that escape into any publicly accessible place would not be
classified as a search. The language and logic of the cases seem to impose
no barrier to such an extension of reasoning. Indeed, the Court has shown
some tendency to move in that very direction.9 °
The judicial analysis of the issue of whether a dog sniff is a search
is arguably illogical and inconsistent-both internally and with general
fourth amendment law. It represents a dangerous erosion of what the
courts consider to be reasonable expectations of privacy and, therefore,
of the scope of the protections accorded by the fourth amendment.
Sniffs as Subsearches
The dangers and deficiencies of the majority view that a sniff is not
a search can be avoided by the adoption of a position similar to that
adhered to by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Beale: A canine sniff
is a limited fourth amendment intrusion which may be founded on
something less than probable cause or a warrant.9 ' In fact, such a solu-
tion was suggested in 1976,92 years before the majority view developed.
An analogy to this approach in general fourth amendment law is found
in Terry v. Ohio.93 Terry recognizes that the fourth amendment is not
violated by an intrusion that is not a "full-blown search," 9 ' although not
supported by a warrant or probable cause, as long as the intrusion is
supported by "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." 95
Since a dog's sniff is considerably less intrusive than conventional means
of searching for contraband and yet does intrude upon protected fourth
amendment privacy interests, it may properly be considered a "subsearch"
analogous to a Terry-stop.96 Even though Terry is specifically directed
to stops of suspicious persons, there is support in the jurisprudence for
extension of the subsearch principles to objects as well.'
Such an approach has several salutary effects. Placing sniffs under
90. United States v. Knotts, 103 S. Ct. 1081 (1983). In Knolls the Court held that
the placement of beepers in several drums of chemicals sold to persons suspected of manufac-
turing illegal drugs did not invoke the fourth amendment. Justice Rehnquist, writing for
the Court, commented that "[nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from
augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as
science and technology afforded them in this case." Id. at 1086.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 29-31.
92. Peebles, The Uninvited Canine Nose and the Right to Privacy: Some Thoughts
on Katz and Dogs, 11 GA. L. REV. 75, 95-104 (1976).
93. 392 U.S. 1 (1967).
94. Id. at 19.
95. Id. at 21.
96. See Peebles, supra note 92, at 95.
97. United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 253 (1970); United States v. Martell,
654 F.2d 1356, 1358-59 (9th Cir. 1981).
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the regulation of the fourth amendment allows judicial scrutiny of their
reasonableness. Courts could consider the nature and scope of the sniff,
the particularity of the suspicion which prompted it, the social interest
being protected, and the privacy interest being infringed upon. 9 Courts
would then be free to develop guidelines for regulating this activity, for-
mulated in the laboratory of experience and based on the overriding re-
quirement of reasonableness. This approach is also more realistic in that
it recognizes the subjective sensation of being searched which most people
probably experience upon being subjected to a sniff inspection, as well
as the legitimate and significant law enforcement interests advanced by
the use of this powerful drug-detecting tool.
Distinguishing full searches from subsearches would also be fertile
ground for the development of judicial guidelines. Since allowing courts
to make this distinction allows them to remedy abuse over a broader range
of potentially invasive activities, thus strengthening the fourth amendment,
such decisions are a far more appropriate arena for judicial discretion
than is the initial determination of whether the fourth amendment is in-
voked at all.99 This approach would not significantly impair airport sniffs
because, as has already been observed, virtually all of the reported cases
involve sniffs prompted by a drug courier profile or some other suspicious
activity. These justifications should make the sniff a reasonable
subsearch.'00 The broad standard of reasonableness should also be applied
to school sniffs. Warrantless sniffs should generally be limited to instances
where there is a demonstrable drug problem in the school and where suspi-
cion is directed at an individual or a highly circumscribed group of in-
dividuals. "Dragnet sniffs" of persons should never be allowed except
in the unlikely event that a warrant can be procured, while dragnet sniffs
of cars and lockers should be limited to schools where the drug problem
has reached crisis proportions and school officials have no other effective
weapon at their disposal to protect the children from this menace to their
physical and mental health.
Conclusion
Canine sniffing to detect contraband is an important and increasingly
pervasive law enforcement practice which has spawned a large number
of reported cases, most of which purport to hold that a dog sniff is not
a search invoking the fourth amendment. Arguably, these cases are
analytically flawed and inconsistent and constitute a dangerous erosion
of the fourth amendment. Classification of dog sniffs as subsearches
98. See Peebles, supra note 92, at 95-96.
99. Id. at 86.
100. See Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1326 (1983). But see United States v.
Hernandez-Cuartas, 717 F.2d 552, 555 (11th Cir. 1983).
[Vol. 441106
1984] NOTES 1107
governed by the fourth amendment standard of reasonableness but exempt
from warrant and probable cause requirements would allow needed judicial
scrutiny while still giving law enforcement officials considerable latitude
in sniffing out crime with the sensitive canine nose.
H. Paul Honsinger

